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GNSS Challenges: GPS Tested by DOD 
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Everyday Localized GNSS Outages 
 
 
GPS jammers and spoofing 
Mechanical / antenna failures 
Environmental / lightning storms 
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Frequency and Phase Specifications 
CDMA2000  
TD-SCDMA 
GSM / UMTS / W-CDMA 
NA  
± 1.5 µs  
± 1 µs 
± 0.5 to ± 1.5 µs 
± 5 µs 
± 3 to 10 µs  
± 1.5 µs  
Application Phase 
 Frequency:  
Physical  / Air Interface 
NA 
*Multiple proposals under consideration 
 UMTS/LTE FDD Residential Small Cell           NA         /            250 ppb  NA 
 UMTS Metro Small Cell           NA          /            100  ppb  NA 
16 ppb      /      50 ppb    
LTE -FDD 
LTE-TDD 
LTE-A   MBSFN 
LTE-A   CoMP (Network MIMO) * 
HetNet Coordination (eICIC) 
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LTE Synchronization  
Application 
Frequency / Air   
Interfaces 
 Time /Phase 
Why  You Need 
to Comply  
Impact of 
Non-compliance 
16 / 50 ppb  
16 / 50 ppb  
16 / 50 ppb  
16 / 50 ppb  
  N/A 
+/-   1.5 µs 
 +/-   32 µs 
 +/-   500 ns 
Call Initiation 
Time slot alignment 
Proper time alignment  
of  video signal decoding   
from multiple BTSs 
Coordination of  signals 
 to/from multiple  
base stations 
Call  Interference  
Dropped calls 
Packet loss/collisions 
Spectral efficiency 
Video broadcast  
interruption  
Poor signal quality  
at edge of cells, LBS 
accuracy 
LTE (FDD)  
LTE (TDD) 
LTE MBSFN  
LTE-A MIMO/COMP 
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Timing Technology Options 
Satellite based 
Network based 
GNSS 
IEEE 1588 (Frequency and phase) 
Synchronous Ethernet (SyncE) 
Resilient Networks Needs 2 Out of 3  
Holdover Protection Rubidium 
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Outline 
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• Inside a GPS spoofing attack 
• Example effects of time manipulation on 
communications, finance, and energy 
sectors 
• Misconceptions about timing security 
• Options for secure ns-accurate timing 
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Example Attack 
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Spoofer 
Spoofed clock 
Reference clock 
Inside the target receiver: 
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Inside the target receiver: 
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Inside the target receiver: 
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Inside the target receiver: 
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Inside the target receiver: 
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Inside the target receiver: 
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Spoofer’s Effect on PPS Phase 
Reference 
Spoofed 
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Example Effects: CDMA Cellular Systems 
• CDMA 2000 standard requires towers to be synchronized to 
within 10 us of GPS time  
• Synchronization has many benefits: soft handoff, more 
efficient acquisition, better power efficiency in handset 
• Towers all use same spreading code; they distinguish 
themselves by the phase of this code in 52-us increments 
• A spoofer could induce a 10-us error in a tower in less than 30 
mins;  thereafter, handoff to nearby towers would become 
unreliable 
• Worse yet, a coordinated spoofing attack could bring multiple 
towers into spreading code phase alignment:  Handsets near 
cell edges may not be able to connect calls   
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Example Effects: Smart Energy 
Distribution 
• Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) are a key enabling 
technology for the next-generation power grid 
• PMUs require synchronization to better than 26 us 
• All PMUs rely on GPS for synchronization 
• Latest PMUs have been built with control in mind:  can 
be configured to take immediate control action (e.g., trip 
a generator) if PMU data indicate a fault condition 
• A spoofing attack against a PMU can simulate a fault 
condition 
D.P. Shepard, T.E. Humphreys, A.A. Fansler, "Evaluation of the Vulnerability of Phasor Measurement Units 
to GPS Spoofing Attacks Evaluation of the Vulnerabilityof Phasor Measurement Units to GPS Spoofing 
Attacks," International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Vol. 5, December, 2012. 
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Background: Post-2007 “REG NMS” regulations have fragmented US markets, 
forcing  large investors to “vacuum up” liquidity from multiple trading venues 
 
Problem:  Liquidity vanishes as high-frequency traders (HFTs) sense the 
presence of a large institutional trader (IT) (a “whale”) in one venue and then alter 
orders in other venues before the IT can complete its orders there.  
 
Whales Strike Back:  In response to the HFT’s (entirely legal) game of bait-and-
switch, ITs have developed a powerful weapon: smart order routing (SOR).    
 
SOR’s Timing Component: SORs continuously monitor round-trip times to 
various exchanges (and possibly monitor time stamps).  They then break up large 
orders and launch them so that they arrive at multiple exchanges simultaneously.    
 
 
Example Effects: Smart Order Routing 
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Suppose, due to geometrical distance and networking 
delays, the route to NYSE is 2 ms shorter than route to 
BATS 
NYSE 
(Mahwah, NJ) 
BATS 
(Camdon, NJ) 
HFT  
(co-lo) Institutional 
Trader 
(Boston, MA) 
Smart Order Routing 
Buyers (Bid) Sellers (Ask) 
Share
s 
Pric
e 
Share
s 
Pric
e 
70 $45 100 $55 
50 $56 
Buyers (Bid) Sellers (Ask) 
Share
s 
Pric
e 
Share
s 
Pric
e 
20 $45 50 $55 
175 $57 
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Buy 
100  
Shares 
SOR delays NYSE order by 2 ms so that both orders arrive 
simultaneously 
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HFT  
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simultaneously 
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SOR delays NYSE order by 2 ms so that both orders arrive 
simultaneously 
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 Trade executed at best price:  The HFT could not alter orders at either exchange  
because the orders from the IT arrived simultaneously 
 
NYSE 
(Mahwah, NJ) 
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HFT  
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Smart Order Routing 
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e 
Share
s 
Pric
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If SORs only use round-trip time (RTT) to measure delays to each 
exchange, then they have no dependence on absolute time.  But there 
can be many 100s of microseconds of error in the estimated forward-path 
delay when only RTT measurements are used:  HFTs can exploit this 
error!  Consequently, there is increasing pressure on the exchanges to 
timestamp order arrivals with (absolute) microsecond accuracy.  Such 
timestamps would likely allow the forward-path delay to each exchange 
to be estimated accurately enough (e.g., < 100 us) that HFTs could not 
exploit the remaining errors. 
 
But market reliance on absolute time stamps opens up a 
vulnerability to time manipulation …  
An Absolute Time Component to Smart Order 
Routing 
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Action: Spoofer advances time at NYSE by 2 ms. 
Result: An SOP reliant on absolute time stamps now sees  
equivalent-time routes to NYSE and BATS  
 
NYSE 
(Mahwah, NJ) 
BATS 
(Camdon, NJ) 
HFT  
(co-lo) Institutional 
Trader 
(Boston, MA) 
Smart Order Routing 
GPS-Spoofing-Assisted Frontrunning 
Buyers (Bid) Sellers (Ask) 
Share
s 
Pric
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Share
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NYSE 
(Mahwah, NJ) 
BATS 
(Camdon, NJ) 
HFT  
(co-lo) Institutional 
Trader 
(Boston, MA) 
Smart Order Routing 
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Buy 
100  
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Buy 50 
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Buyers (Bid) Sellers (Ask) 
Share
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Pric
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Share
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SOR issues both market orders simultaneously 
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Trade executed at best price at NYSE.  
HFT detects “whale” at NYSE and quickly changes ask price at BATS; HFT’s 
alteration arrives before the IT’s order.   
NYSE 
(Mahwah, NJ) 
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New price at BATS 
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Trade executed at HFT price at BATS.  
 
HFT makes profit at $1/share. 
NYSE 
(Mahwah, NJ) 
BATS 
(Camdon, NJ) 
HFT  
(co-lo) Institutional 
Trader 
(Boston, MA) 
Smart Order Routing 
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Misconceptions About Timing Security 
(1/2) 
• “Holdover” capability of GPS-disciplined oscillator 
(GPSDO) protects against spoofing 
• Holdover will not be triggered by a sophisticated 
spoofing attack 
• The reference oscillator’s drift rate is the upper limit of 
speed at which a GPSDO can be spoofed (e.g., 1 us per 
day) 
• Drift rate only matters if GPSDO is configured to 
alarm on a mismatch between GPS rate and internal 
clock rate 
• Even then, spoofer can push GPS timing at ~5x the 
calibrated clock drift rate because of need to keep 
false alarm rate low 
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Misconceptions About Timing Security 
(2/2) 
• Timing errors only become a problem at the level of 
seconds, or maybe milliseconds. 
• Microseconds matter for comms, finance, and energy 
sectors 
• Cross-checking against an atomic clock affords foolproof 
timing security 
•  Rubidium clock with stability of 10^(-12) can be 
pushed off by ~100 ns per day  
•  PTP/NTP are the solution to GPS spoofing problem 
• These are getting better, but, due to network 
asymmetry, they still not accurate enough for most 
demanding applications non-dedicated networks 
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Options for Secure ns-Accurate Timing 
(1/2) 
• Obtain required permissions to purchase SAASM-equipped 
GPSDO  
• Lots of paperwork, special handling 
• Expensive 
• Fairly secure against spoofing 
• Not secure against replay attack 
• Wait for GPS Directorate to insert digital signatures into 
modernized GPS signals 
• They’re making progress! (The University of Texas is 
helping.) 
• Not so strong as SAASM for timing security, but quite 
effective 
• Eventually inexpensive, but will require new GPSRO 
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Options for Secure ns-Accurate Timing 
(1/2) 
• Cross-check GPS timing against redundant high-quality (e.g., 
atomic) clocks 
• Self-contained 
• Expensive 
• Absolutely secure to within about 5x the drift rate of 
ensemble 
• “All Signals” Approach: Develop a GPSDO that pulls in signals 
from GPS + Glonass + Galileo and rigorously cross-checks 
these 
• None on market yet (so far as I’m aware) 
• Potentially inexpensive: uBlox LEA-7 runs  ~$50 
• Spoofer’s job gets much harder with each new signal 
• PTP/NTP over a dedicated network  
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Reliable Network-Based Timing 
Martin Nuss, Ph.D. 
Vice President, Technology and Strategy and CTO 
Vitesse Semiconductor 
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Overview 
• We need a backup for GPS to provide timing 
 
• Packet-based network timing using IEEE1588 Precision 
Time Protocol is the solution 
 
• Even stringent TD-LTE and LTE-A timing requirements 
can be met 
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New Base Stations Require New Timing 
Models 
E1/T1 
GPS Rx 
Ethernet 
 
 
  E1/T1 
(Gigabit) 
Ethernet 
Primary  
Reference  
Time Clock 
New 2G/3G/4G Cells 
 New base stations use Gigabit 
Ethernet for backhaul 
 TD-LTE and LTE-A need phase 
in addition to frequency synch 
 For 2G/3G, E1/T1 backhaul 
also provided (frequency) 
synchronization 
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 Indoor Picocells 
 Picocells or Enterprise Femtocells for LTE indoor 
coverage & capacity 
 Can’t get timing to Femtocells using GPS 
 Outdoor Small Cells 
 Small Cells to deliver LTE capacity 
 Often no line of sight to GPS satellites 
 More vulnerable to attacks at street level  
GPS Not Viable in Many New LTE 
Deployments 
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The Solution: Timing Over IP/Ethernet 
Two new methods for carrying timing and synchronization  
over Ethernet networks have emerged 
 Line timing of the each Ethernet interface 
 Can deliver only frequency, not phase 
 
G.8262 SyncE 
 Time stamped Sync packets & protocol exchange 
 Over 1M Base Stations support 1588 PTP today 
 1588 can deliver frequency AND phase 
 
IEEE1588-2008 
Precision Time 
Protocol 
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Frequency Delivery Over PTP-Unaware 
Networks 
ITU-T G.8261.1 test cases compared  
against G.823 Traf & SEC  MTIE masks 
10s 100s 1000s 10000s 
10
n
s 
1µ
s 
10
0µ
s 
Master 
Clock 
Slave 
Packet Network 
(no 1588 awareness) 
 ITU-T G.8261.1 completed work 
on 1588 FREQUENCY delivery   
 Packet delay variations (PDV) 
need to be within bounds 
 Software algorithms (“servos”) 
are key to filter out effect of PDV   
 Key servo performance usually 
long-term wander 
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LTE Can Require Very High Phase/Time 
Accuracy 
• Many wireless standards require 
PHASE synchronization in 
addition to frequency 
• LTE-Advanced in particular 
requires very tight phase synch 
• Standards are in the process of 
defining time and phase delivery 
via IEEE1588 to these specs 
 
Air Interface Phase  
Accuracy Specs 
3-10 µs CDMA2000 
1.5 µs TD-SCDMA 
1.5 µs TD-LTE 
500 ns LTE-A 
LTE Hetnet 5 µs 
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Factors That Impair PTP Time & Phase 
Accuracy 
• Upstream/downstream packet 
delay asymmetries translate 
directly into time & phase errors 
• Packet switching inherently has 
unpredictable queuing and 
forwarding delays 
• Additional  mechanisms become 
important when getting into the 
100ns accuracy range 
Queuing and forwarding delay asymmetries alone can be >100µs, 
blowing LTE phase accuracy requirements by 2 orders of magnitude  
Queuing & Forwarding (10-100µs) 
Link Asymmetries (10-100ns) 
I/O Serialization (10-100ns) 
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Boundary and Transparent Clocks to the 
Rescue 
Master 
Clock 
Slave 
BC 
TC 
BC 
TC 
BC 
TC 
BC 
TC 
BC 
TC 
Network 
      
 
Boundary Clock (BC) 
 Recovers clock from the master, and regenerates clock towards next node 
 Can be combined with Time Stamping at the PHY level to eliminate I/O serialization PDV 
      
 
Transparent Clock (TC) 
 Simply corrects the Sync packet time stamp for residence time in the node 
 Can be implemented solely at the PHY level if desired 
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Network Timing Cost Comparison 
• Boundary Clocks more 
expensive than Transparent 
Clocks 
• Switches and Routers 
typically implement both 
• TC can lower cost of clock 
recovery at slave 
• Could be important for cost 
sensitive Small Cells 
 
C
o
st
 
• Time Stamping on Ingress 
and Egress 
• Needs PLL, OCXO & 1588 
Protocol in every node 
Boundary Clocks 
Transparent Clocks 
• Time Stamping on Ingress 
and Egress 
• No PLL, no OCXO, no 1588 
protocol processing 
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Performance of a BC/TC Network 
Configuration 
Frequency 
Support 
1PPS MTIE 
(5000 s) 
1 PPS  
Max TE 
Master -  
9 x TC -  
Slave 
PTP 24 ns 25 ns 
SyncE 17 ns 11 ns 
Master -  
9 x T-BC - 
Slave 
PTP 75 ns 51 ns 
SyncE 30 ns 17 ns 
Select ITU-T G.8261.1 test cases; for details  
see WD17, June 2012 ITU-T SG15 Meeting  
For Fiber or 1000Base-T connected nodes,  
sub-10ns maximum time errors can easily be achieved 
 Nanosecond-level MTIE and Max 
Time Errors for both BC and TC  
 No dependence on traffic load 
 PHY-based time stamping 
removes queuing as well as I/O 
serialization PDV 
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54% 
42% 
4% 
2016 Air 
Fiber 
Copper 
Source:  Infonetics 
 Backhaul can be fiber, microwave, or copper 
 >85% of Small Cells will be connected by 
Microwave or Millimeter-wave (Infonetics) 
Network Timing over Microwave  
more difficult than over Fiber  
Not all Backhaul Networks are Alike 
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Equipment Type 
Time Error 
Budget 
Switch/Router 
(1000BT or Fiber) 
10-20ns 
Microwave Link 100ns 
GPON 100ns 
DSL ? 
Time Error Budgets for Various Link 
Types 
BC/TC can control Time Errors to <10ns; 
Distributed TC can keep MW & PON to <100ns 
49 
ATIS Board of Directors’ Meeting 
October 20, 2011 
GPS Vulnerabilities and Implications for Telecom 
Thursday, February 7, 2013 
Equipment 
Max Time 
Error 
Hop 
Count 
Small Cell 20 ns 3 
MW/MMW Link 100 ns 2 
Cell-site 
Gateway 
20 ns 1 
Pre-Aggregation 
Router/Switch 
20 ns 1 
Aggregation 
Router 
20 ns 10 
Total Network Time Error 500 ns 
Calculating Maximum Network Time 
Errors 
• Operators need an easy way to 
calculate maximum time error 
• This is possible if standards 
specify maximum time errors 
per equipment class 
1588 network timing will be possible even with multiple 
Microwave links in the last mile 
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Summary and Conclusions 
51 
• GPS cannot be the only source of timing – we need a 
backup! 
 
• IEEE1588 PTP with Boundary and Transparent Clock 
support can provide networks based timing even for TD-
LTE & LTE-Advanced 
 
• Standards should allocate time error budgets per 
equipment class so operators can easily calculate 
maximum network time errors for heterogeneous 
backhaul networks  
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Thank you for attending 
GPS Vulnerabilities and Implications for Telecom 
 
All registered attendees will receive a follow up 
email containing links to a recording and the 
slides from this presentation.  
 
For information on upcoming ATIS events, visit 
www.atis.org/events 
 
